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THE ROLE OF DEPRECIATION AND THE 
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT IN TAX POLICY 
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
DURING THE 20TH CENTURY 
Abstract. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the 
investment tax credit and depreciation have been some of the 
most modified provisions. This paper traces the history of 
major changes in depreciation and the investment tax credit 
along with the tax policy justifications given at the time the 
changes were made. In addition, the influence of tax depreci-
ation on financial reporting is also discussed. An historical 
perspective of these two major provisions in tax should be 
helpful to policymakers and researchers attempting to assess 
the effectiveness of these policies. 
INTRODUCTION 
All machinery is on an irresistible march to the 
junk heap, and its progress, while it may be 
delayed, cannot be prevented by repairs. This 
obvious economic fact is of momentous import to 
accounting, although full recognition has not 
been given to it in general practice... It implies 
that, in valuing all fixed assets, account must be 
taken of the lapse of time, and even in the case of 
machinery giving no evidence either of use or mis-
use, the bare fact that it is a year nearer its 
inevitable goal is an item of which technical 
account must be taken [Hatfield, 1927, p. 130]. 
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A depreciation deduction has been a part of modern U.S. 
income tax since its inception. It is at the nexus of several tax pol-
icy objectives that at times compete against and at other times 
complement one another. Since its debut with the corporate 
excise tax in 1909, the law regarding depreciation has been 
amended at least once in every decade. The tax policy motiva-
tions for these changes are attributed to any of the following: 
proper income measurement, raising revenue, encouraging capi-
tal formation, or ensuring a neutral tax system. Since so many tax 
policy goals can be ostensibly served by the deduction, it is not 
surprising that the law has changed so many times during the 
20th century. 
An historical perspective on the role of depreciation would 
not be complete without including a discussion of a related provi-
sion, the investment tax credit (ITC). The primary purpose of ITC 
is to spur capital formation. When capital formation is an impor-
tant tax policy goal, there are often changes to depreciation, ITC, 
or both. The potential for depreciation and ITC to alter capital for-
mation has drawn the attention of a wide variety of academicians. 
Despite years of study, the results from empirical research are far 
from conclusive.1 Notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evi-
dence about their effectiveness, tax policymakers have used 
depreciation and ITC as a means to alter investment spending. 
The purpose of this paper is to document the changes in depreci-
ation and ITC, the tax policy motivations behind these changes, 
and the context for the changes that have occurred since the mod-
ern U.S. income tax began. By understanding the context for past 
legislation, both researchers and policymakers can better under-
stand past, current, and potential changes. 
The history of the role of depreciation in the income tax can 
be defined into five time periods: 1909-1953, 1954-1961, 1962-
1980, 1981-1985, and 1986 to the present. The legislation of 1954, 
1962, 1981, and 1986 represented major shifts with regard to tax 
policy and its relationship to depreciation or ITC. The discussion 
below documents the changes and the tax policy motivations for 
each change that occurred during each time period. In addition, 
economic and other relevant factors are also addressed. 
1See Chirinko [1986, 1993] for critical analyses of empirical research related 
to investment spending. 
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THE EARLY YEARS: 1909-1953 
An allowance for depreciation has been included as a deduc-
tion for determining taxable income since the inception of mod-
ern corporate and individual income taxes.2 The corporate excise 
tax enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1909 permitted "a reason-
able allowance for depreciation of property, if any." The Revenue 
Act of 1913 permitted "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, 
wear and tear of property arising out of its use in a business." The 
early rationale for the depreciation deduction is contained in the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue's Regulation 74, Article 202 in which 
it posited that the necessity for a depreciation deduction arises 
from the fact that certain business property is subject to exhaus-
tion. Depreciation's role was primarily that of income determina-
tion. With its inclusion of depreciation in the income tax base, 
the government was actually taking a bold step that differed from 
much of financial reporting practice of the day.3 In commenting 
about financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th 
century, Hatfield [1927, p. 140] offered the following summary: 
Present practice unfortunately does not always 
correspond to current principle. Corporations 
are still apt to look upon the charge for deprecia-
tion as being an act of grace rather than of neces-
sity, and the allowance is frequently less in the lean 
than in the prosperous years. But the improve-
ment since . . . 1908 has been very marked. At that 
time any recognition of depreciation was relative-
ly uncommon in the accounts of American corpo-
rations, and the relatively few companies that 
showed depreciation in prosperous years grew 
2The U.S. first enacted an income tax in 1861 to fund the Civil War. This tax 
did not m e n t i o n deprec ia t ion . Deprec ia t ion was specifically exc luded as a 
deduction for the 1894 income tax which was ruled unconstitutional. Thus, a 
depreciation deduction was not provided for in the calculation of taxable income 
prior to 1909. The corporation excise tax enacted in 1909 was a tax on corporate 
income. The inception of the modern-day individual income tax began with the 
ratification of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on February 25, 1913, 
and the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913 on March 1, 1913. 
3Grant and Norton [1949, p. 249] noted that, "it is significant that the first 
recognition of annual expense of depreciation for tax purposes occurred in the 
same year in which depreciation was first recognized by the Supreme Court 
[Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U.S. 1 (1909)] as an element in the 
regulation of public utility rates." 
3
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faint-hearted when business was poor. But an 
examination of the balance sheets during the try-
ing period after the Great War shows that many of 
them made charges for depreciation even though 
that resulted in a net deficit. This closer adher-
ence to correct accounting principles was doubt-
less stimulated by the provisions of the income-tax 
law. 
Saliers [ 1923] offered a similar summary, noting that firms refused 
to allow for depreciation expense early in the 20th century. In his 
view, corporations in 1922 were still varying their depreciation 
deductions with their earnings. By 1932, Paton [1932, p. 578] 
noted: 
Depreciation accounting has by no means attained 
an ideal state, but there is now almost universal 
agreement as to the general significance of depre-
ciation and the importance of recognizing the 
phenomenon in some appropriate manner. The 
cost of plant assets which have a limited useful life 
must evidently be taken into consideration, in 
some other way if not in the form of systematic 
accruals, if costs of production are to be accurate-
ly calculated, periodic income determined on a 
sound basis, and the integrity of investment main-
tained. The income tax regulations have no doubt 
been more potent in bringing about this condition 
than the admonitions of accountants or the argu-
ments of academicians. 
Thus, it appears that early efforts to define taxable income by 
including depreciation had an impact on financial reporting prac-
tice in the early part of the 20th century. Apparently, however, 
financial managers exercised a considerable degree of discretion 
with regard to the amount of depreciation, if any, that was 
expensed on their income statements for financial reporting. For 
the first third of the 20th century, they also had a great degree of 
latitude with regard to how much depreciation they deducted for 
income tax purposes. 
In 1920, the Treasury first issued Bulletin F, leaving the deter-
mination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer based on 
his judgment and experience, with final approval by the 
4
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Commissioner. Thus, taxpayers had a considerable degree of free-
dom in determining their depreciation deductions. During the 
1924-1931 time period, depreciation allowances increased sub-
stantially. 
By 1931, claimed depreciation deductions exceeded corporate 
taxable income [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1934]. In 1931, the Treasury issued a revised Bulletin F. It 
attached a preliminary study that gave "probable useful lives" for 
over 2,700 different kinds of industrial assets. Determining a 
depreciation deduction remained at the taxpayer's discretion, 
however. The deduction would not be disallowed unless the gov-
ernment could demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence" 
that the deduction was "unreasonable." By 1934, the House Ways 
and Means Committee considered substantial across-the-board 25 
percent reductions in depreciation allowances for the 1934 to 
1936 time period. It estimated that the government would receive 
an additional $85 million in tax revenue per year from the recom-
mended changes. 
The Treasury Department, however, opposed an arbitrary 
reduction. It believed that the matter could best be resolved by 
administrative rather than legislative action. Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau proposed that the Treasury require taxpayers to fur-
nish supporting schedules, require depreciation to be limited to 
an asset's useful life, and switch the burden of proof for a reason-
able deduction to the taxpayer. Rather than mandating deprecia-
tion deductions through legislation, the choice was made to han-
dle it administratively through guidelines drafted by the Treasury. 
In 1934, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision 
4422, 1934 CB 58 (TD 4422). TD 4422 outlined the Treasury's 
change in policy as Secretary Morgenthau had proposed. TD 4422 
required taxpayers to furnish a schedule showing their calculation 
of depreciat ion expense to substantiate their deduct ions . 
Taxpayers were allowed to allocate the cost of an asset over its use-
ful life using the straight-line or units-of-production method. 
Until 1934, the burden of proof fell on the Internal Revenue exam-
iner to demonstrate that a taxpayer had misstated income by 
improperly calculating his depreciation expense by clear and con-
vincing evidence. This policy was changed in 1934, shifting the 
burden of proof from the government to the taxpayer. 
In 1942, the Treasury Department issued a second revision of 
Bulletin F. Bulletin F recommended useful lives for over 5,000 
assets. The Treasury's estimates of useful lives, however, were 
5
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based on surveys conducted during the Great Depression of the 
1930s when businesses tended to replace their obsolete assets less 
frequently. Thus, the useful life estimates listed in Bulletin F's revi-
sion were generally longer than an asset's actual useful life and 
longer than in the 1931 version of Bulletin F. This disparity result-
ed in tax depreciation deductions being less than what was con-
sidered economic depreciation. This policy continued until 1954. 
During this time a taxpayer could also use the "facts and cir-
cumstances" method, whereby assets were assigned useful lives 
based on the taxpayer or industry's general experience. However, 
if the taxpayer chose to define an asset's depreciable life using 
Bulletin F rather than the "facts and circumstances" method, he 
avoided controversy in an audit. Thus, many assets were depreci-
ated using either the straight-line or units-of-production method 
over the assets' useful lives as defined in Bulletin F. It was not until 
1954 that the tax laws were revised to bring tax depreciation 
more in line with what was considered economic depreciation. 
A SHIFT IN TAX POLICY PERSPECTIVE: 1954-1961 
Until 1954, Congress viewed depreciation solely as a deduc-
tion necessary for proper income determination. The deduction 
was an allowance which reflected the "exhaustion, wear and tear 
of property used in a trade or business" [IRC §167(a)]. The 
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however, 
marked a major shift in depreciation's role in tax policy. For the 
first time Congress considered using tax depreciation as an eco-
nomic incentive for stimulating investment. It also marked the 
first time Congress, rather than the Treasury, decided the allow-
able means for calculating the deduction. 
The tax law change in 1954 allowed businesses to use any 
method of depreciation as long as it was both consistently applied 
and did not exceed twice the straight-line rate of depreciation. 
Congress believed that the pre-1954 depreciation system acted as 
a barrier to investment. It also believed that the pre-1954 "tax 
depreciation methods might depress business capital expendi-
tures below the level needed to keep the economy operating at 
high levels of output and employment" [U.S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 22]. Thus, the 1954 tax 
changes were designed to provide incentives for investment. 
At the same time, however, Congress was also concerned 
about the effect these changes would have on income determina-
tion. The new methods of depreciation would: 
6
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...concentrate deductions in the early years of ser-
vice and [would result] in a timing of allowances 
more in accord with the actual pattern of loss of 
economic usefulness. With the rate limited to 
twice the corresponding straight-line rate and 
based on a realistic estimate of useful life, the pro-
posed system [would conform] to sound account-
ing principles [U.S. Congress, House, Committee 
on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 23]. 
Thus, Congress wanted to stimulate investment while remaining 
within economic and accounting principles. With the 1954 law, 
Congress sanctioned the use of the double-declining balance 
method. This was the first time Congress opted to decide what 
depreciation methods should be allowed. Up until this time, 
depreciation was handled administratively through the Treasury 
Department. 
In 1958, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 intro-
duced first-year depreciation for the first time. This allowed small 
businesses to deduct up to 20% of the cost of tangible personal 
property.4 The purpose of this provision was to assist small busi-
ness by increasing the amount of funds available to them via a 
reduction in tax liability [Congressional Record, 1958, pp. 17,085, 
17,090]. A variation of this election, known as the immediate 
expense election, remains today5 
THE 1960s AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
Investment Tax Credit Enacted (1962): The Revenue Act of 1962 
(RA62) represents a landmark in terms of tax incentives for invest-
ment. ITC was first introduced in RA62.6 President Kennedy 
advocated enacting the credit to stimulate capital formation. He 
believed higher levels of capital formation would raise productiv-
ity, keep people employed, and alleviate a serious balance of pay-
4 T h e maximum eligible cost was $10,000 for unmarried taxpayers ($20,000 
for married taxpayers) for a maximum deduction of $2,000 and $4,000 respec-
tively. 
5 T h e deduction is no longer a percentage of allowable cost, but is an election 
to deduct the full cost of property up to $20,000 in the year 2000 (increasing to 
$25,000 for the years 2003 and thereafter). 
6A credit, as opposed to a deduction, is a dollar for dollar reduction of a tax-
payer's tax liability. The first ITC was 7% of the cost of personalty in the year of 
acquisition. 7
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ments problem [U.S. Congress, House, 1961, p. 3]. Congress 
echoed his sentiments by stating that the objective of the credit 
was "to encourage modernization and expansion of the Nation's 
productive facilities and thereby improve the economic potential 
of the country, with resultant increase in job opportunities and 
betterment of our competitive position in the world economy" 
[U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11]. 
Stimulating investment was to be accomplished through two 
major tax revisions. These were the Treasury's revision of depre-
ciation guidelines and ITC. Congress believed that realistic depre-
ciation rules did not provide sufficient incentive to spur econom-
ic growth. An additional incentive in the form of an ITC would 
stimulate investment in two ways. First, it would reduce the net 
cost of acquiring depreciable assets. Second, it would increase the 
cash flow available for investment7 [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11]. 
Congress also considered the possibility of using more accel-
erated methods of depreciation in lieu of a credit. This idea was 
discarded, however. Congress believed the credit was "preferable 
to higher depreciation charges because the latter tends to distort 
income accounting" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1962, p. 12]. It seems clear that Congress did not wish to 
deviate materially from accounting and economic concepts of 
income in order to stimulate investment. 
ITC Suspension (1966-1967): In 1966, the U.S. faced problems 
with inflation. Therefore, President Johnson initiated a compre-
hensive plan which called for reducing government expenditures 
for low-priority programs and temporarily suspending tax incen-
tives for investment [U.S. Congress, House, 1966, pp. 4-7]. 
Congress noted that the bill was: 
...part of an overall program designed to moderate 
the pace of the economy to a level more compati-
ble with the rate of increase in our physical capac-
ity to produce, to begin the return to price stabili-
ty and to relieve distortions among various sectors 
of the economy which arise from widely different 
7The reasoning behind this argument is that a firm would have a pool of avail-
able funds for investment. The 7% credit for new investment would augment this 
pool so that more investment could be made. 
8
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rates of growth. By removing certain tax incen-
tives for investment in machinery, equipment and 
buildings, the bill will ease inflationary pressures 
in those sectors where demands for output are 
straining present productive capacity The action 
also will have the effect of reducing pressures 
tending to raise interest rates and will promote an 
increased flow of credit into the home mortgage 
market. Moreover, the bill can be expected to pro-
duce a short-run improvement in the Nation's bal-
ance-of-payments position as demand for output is 
brought into balance with the existing capacity to 
p roduce the output [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1966, p. 4]. 
Thus, ITC and accelerated depreciation on real property were 
temporarily suspended from October 10, 1966 to December 31, 
1967. 
The suspension ended up being short-lived. On June 13, 1967, 
President Johnson signed H.R. 6950 [P.L. 90-26], lifting the sus-
pension effective March 10, 1967. At the time ITC was reinstated, 
interest rates were dropping and housing starts were up. It 
appeared as if the economy was rebounding and the suspension 
no longer necessary 
ITC Abolished (1969-1971): In 1969, problems with inflation 
reappeared. Once again, Congress believed that ITC directly con-
tributed to inflationary pressures and wide fluctuations in invest-
ment. Eliminating the credit would help reduce inflation and help 
keep the rate of change in investment on a more steady path [U.S. 
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 178]. 
Although Congress considered suspending the credit as it had 
done a few years earlier, the idea was rejected on two grounds. 
First and foremost, Congress believed that during the prior sus-
pension period (1966-1967), businesses had simply postponed 
their acquisitions until after the suspension was lifted. In the 
view of Congress, it was "undesirable to repeat that experience" 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 
179]. Second, suspension and subsequent restoration of the cred-
it were administratively difficult. 
Therefore, Congress voted to repeal ITC. At the time the cred-
it was repealed, Congress had no plans for bringing it back any 
time in the future. In fact, it believed that: 9
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...It [might] well be that the normal incentives of 
potentially greater profits in the context of a sta-
ble growth, full employment economy will pro-
vide the investment needed without resorting to 
special devices to stimulate investment which, on 
occasion, appear to give rise to investment booms 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, 1969, p. 180]. 
DEPRECIATION FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO 
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971 
Revenue Procedure 62-21: Although the depreciation rules did 
not change as frequently during the 1960s as those associated 
with ITC, depreciation did not escape controversy. In 1962, the 
next major change with regard to depreciation occurred. That 
year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure 
62-21, 1962-2 CB 418 (Revenue Procedure 62-21). Bulletin F had 
defined useful lives on an asset-by-asset basis. Revenue Procedure 
62-21 took a different approach by grouping assets by industry of 
use. The guideline lives were based on statistical data and assess-
ment of technological t rends for each industry in the U.S. 
[Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 463]. The new guideline lives 
placed a greater emphasis on the economic life of an asset rather 
than its physical life [Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 464]. As a 
result, write-off periods for assets could be reduced 30 to 40%. A 
taxpayer could only use the new guideline lives, however, if they 
were consistent with the actual retirements and replacement 
practices of his business. This could be demonstrated by a reserve 
ratio test.8 
The reserve ratio test was used to form ranges of depreciable 
lives based on a taxpayer's actual usage. Taxpayers could only con-
t inue to use the generous guideline lives unde r Revenue 
Procedure 62-21 if they conformed to actual service lives as deter-
mined by the reserve ratio test. This test effectively obligated tax-
payers to retire property within the guideline life periods in order 
to continue to use guideline lives. 
Although the IRS initially expected that the guideline lives 
8The reserve ratio was calculated by dividing accumulated depreciation by the 
gross (undepreciated) basis of an asset within a class. This ratio was then used to 
form a range for depreciable lives no greater than 20% or no less than 10% of a 
benchmark life based on actual usage of the firm's assets. 10
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under Revenue Procedure 62-21 [p. 464] would alleviate contro-
versy, implementation of the reserve ratio test proved controver-
sial. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 CB 503 (Announcement 71-76) 
criticized the reserve ratio test on the basis that one could not 
determine if guideline lives had been violated until an asset was 
disposed [Announcement 71-76, pp. 503, 511]. In addition, a sur-
vey indicated that 87% of IRS agents found the test unworkable 
and impractical [Announcement 71-76, p. 512]. The reserve ratio 
test was abandoned with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 
1971. 
Along with the controversy surrounding the IRS's implemen-
tation of Revenue Procedure 62-21 during the 1960s, Congress 
also made a few innovations to tax law associated with deprecia-
tion. With the Revenue Act of 1962, Section 1245 depreciation 
recapture was introduced for the first time. This provision con-
verts the character of a gain from the sale of personalty that is 
attributable to prior depreciation into ordinary income. Congress 
wished to prevent using depreciation to convert ordinary income 
into capital gains [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
1962]. The Revenue Act of 1964 extended depreciation recapture 
to buildings with Section 1250 recapture, subsequently made 
more stringent with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
The Revenue Act of 1971: In the early 1970s, the U.S. faced high 
unemployment, inflation, and little growth in GNP and invest-
ment. The business tax incentives that were enacted in 1971 were 
designed to be "large enough to stimulate the economy and yet 
not so large that they [would] create a new wave of inflationary 
pressure" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1971, p. 
7]. The major business tax incentives were a revision of the 
depreciation rules and a reinstatement of ITC. 
The Revenue Act of 1971 introduced the Class Life Asset 
Depreciation Range System (ADR). ADR provided new guidelines 
for defining an asset's useful life. These guidelines effectively 
replaced the Revenue Procedure 62-21 guidelines that had been 
used until that time. Like Revenue Procedure 62-21, an asset's use-
ful life was defined by its industry of use rather than by type of 
asset.9 The number of asset classes, however, was increased from 
75 to 132. 
9The Treasury Department was given authority to prescribe depreciable lives 
based on anticipated industry norms [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways 
and Means, 1971]. 11
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ADR provided an additional feature not present in Revenue 
Procedure 62-21. Taxpayers were able to select an asset's useful 
life from a range of lives. The range was 20% less than to 20% 
greater than those provided by Revenue Procedure 62-21. The 
Revenue Act of 1971 still allowed taxpayers to define useful lives 
using the "facts and circumstances" method. Congress expected, 
however, that the ranges of lives provided by ADR would make 
administering the depreciation rules simpler. They believed that 
ADR would reduce the number of disputes which were likely to 
arise because of the particular facts and circumstances of the tax-
payer's situation [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 
1971, p. 48]. 
ITC also reappeared under the guise of a jobs development 
investment credit.10 The credit was reinstated for several reasons. 
First, the credit was expected to improve the economy by creating 
additional jobs through increased expenditures in machinery and 
equipment. Second, Congress expected the credit to reduce 
inflation this time because "an increased flow of goods into the 
market is the best long run assurance we can have of keeping 
prices down." Third, new investment in productive facilities 
would help make them more efficient. Therefore, the U.S. would 
be more competitive in foreign markets and the balance of pay-
ments would be improved [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 
Ways and Means, 1971, pp. 5-6]. 
TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 
In 1975, the U.S. faced its highest levels of unemployment 
since 1941. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was designed to 
restore economic growth and to move toward full employment. A 
key component of the Act was a temporary increase in ITC. 
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased ITC from 7% to 10% 
for qualified property acquired before January 1, 1977. Congress 
expected the tax revisions "would help revive the economy and 
increase employment without adding significantly to inflationary 
pressures." Once again, Congress believed that the increase in the 
tax credit would create more jobs, increase productivity, reduce 
inflation, and improve the U.S. balance of payments [U.S. 
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1975, pp. 7-11]. 
10The form of the "jobs development investment credit" was similar to ITC that 
was abolished in 1969. It allowed a credit of 7% of the cost of personalty in the year 
of acquisition. 12
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The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended the "temporary" 
increase in ITC until December 31, 1980. The Revenue Act of 1978 
made the "temporary" increase permanent, effective January 1, 
1981. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE 
ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM (ACRS): 1981-1985 
ACRS: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) represents 
a major turning point in the evolution of depreciation and tax pol-
icy with the first appearance of the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS). Until ERTA, Congress was concerned that tax 
depreciation rules conformed to sound accounting and economic 
principles. Under ERTA, this function of the depreciation deduc-
tion no longer seemed important. In fact, ACRS was so different 
from what accountants and economists typically referred to as 
depreciation that the deductions were called "cost recovery" 
instead of depreciation. With ERTA, simplifying tax rules and 
encouraging investment seemed far more important than con-
forming to accounting practice for financial repor t ing. 
Under ACRS, personalty was categorized into one of four 
"recovery classes." Assets were grouped according to the number 
of years over which their original cost was recovered. Of the four 
personalty recovery classes, only the three-year and five-year class-
es were frequently used. The ten-year and fifteen-year classes 
were reserved for a relatively few specialized assets. Under ERTA, 
all depreciable realty had a 15-year recovery period. 
There were several reasons for enacting ACRS. First, Congress 
concluded that prior depreciation and ITC provisions required 
revisions because they did not provide the investment stimulus 
that was considered essential for economic expansion. Second, 
Congress believed that the prior law was unnecessarily compli-
cated. Third, the real value of depreciation deductions had 
declined because of inflation. It was hoped that ACRS would 
compensate for this problem by giving assets shorter lives [Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, p. 73]. A fourth reason 
mentioned in several hearings was to help the U.S.'s balance of 
payments problem by increasing the nation's competitiveness in 
international trade via increased productivity from investment in 
more modern equipment. In addition to major revisions in depre-
ciation, ERTA modified ITC making it more compatible with 
ACRS. 
13
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Post-ERTA Modifications: 1982 to 1985: During the four years fol-
lowing ERTA, a series of three different pieces of legislation grad-
ually rolled back some of ERTA's generosity. First, the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) required either a 
reduction in depreciable basis or a reduced ITC.11 In addition, 
when ERTA was originally enacted, more accelerated cost recov-
ery schedules were planned to begin in 1985 and 1986.12 TEFRA 
repealed the planned accelerations in depreciation deductions. 
Second, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 lengthened the recov-
ery period for realty from 15 to 18 years. In addition, special limi-
tations for passenger cars were enacted.13 Finally, the Imputed 
Interest Act of 1985 further lengthened the realty recovery period 
from 18 to 19 years. 
All three pieces of legislation were enacted during a time 
when cutting federal budget deficits was a primary concern [U.S. 
Congress, House, 1982; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1985]. The modifications in TEFRA were based on a con-
cern that the combined effect of ITC and the accelerated depreci-
ation in ACRS had been too generous [U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Finance, 1982, p. 126]. In 1984, Congress was con-
cerned that real-estate depreciation had led to excessive tax shel-
11TEFRA required a taxpayer to reduce the depreciable basis of property by 
one-half of ITC taken. Taxpayers could elect to depreciate the full depreciable 
basis of property if they reduced ITC taken. Under this election, property eligible 
for the 10% ITC only received an 8% credit. Property eligible for a 6% ITC received 
a 4% credit. 
l2The ACRS schedules, as enacted in 1981, were developed to approximate 
150% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a switch to straight-
line for later recovery years. Under ERTA, the schedules were to change in 1985 to 
approximate 175% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a 
switch to sum-of-the-years' digits for later years. In 1986, the schedules were to 
change once more reflecting the use of 200% declining balance with a switch to 
sum-of-the-years' digits. 
1 3 T h e Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 limited ACRS deductions to $4,000 for the 
first year and $6,000 each year thereafter for passenger automobiles. In addition, 
ITC was limited to $1,000 ($667 if the taxpayer elected to reduce ITC to be able to 
depreciate the full cost of the asset rather than reducing the depreciable basis by 
one-half of ITC). Congress believed that ITC and ACRS should be used to stimulate 
capital formation rather than to subsidize what it perceived to be "the element of 
personal consumption associated with the use of very expensive automobiles'' 
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. In addition, 
there was a perception that taxpayers tended to overstate the proport ion of busi-
ness use of automobiles. It was Congress' belief that the ACRS and ITC limits 
would assist with compliance in this regard [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on 
Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. 14
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ters to the detriment of more productive investments [U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1984]. When ERTA was 
enacted in 1981, the role of depreciation in income measurement 
was not a concern. By 1985, this concern had resurfaced when the 
Senate Finance Committee felt that "the useful life of most real 
property exceeds 18 years and that an increase in the cost recov-
ery period for real property would more correctly measure the 
income from real property" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Finance, 1985, p. 15]. 
1986 TO PRESENT 
Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is 
the final major shift in depreciation and tax policy. TRA86 
repealed ITC and made additional modifications to ACRS, result-
ing in MACRS. Cultivating investment as a policy goal was not 
abandoned, but the means of doing so were considerably 
changed. 
TRA86 was enacted to increase the fairness, efficiency, and 
simplicity of the tax system [Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986, p. 6]. Congress wished to reduce the role taxes 
play in investment and consumption decisions. Rather than tar-
geting specific forms of investment, Congress believed that the 
"surest way of encouraging the efficient allocation of all resources 
and the greatest possible economic growth was by reducing statu-
tory tax rates" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1986, p. 
98]. 
TRA86 repealed ITC. As opposed to the 1969 repeal, the cur-
rent repeal has been far more long-lived as ITC has not reap-
peared. See Table 1 for a summary of ITC changes. Congress 
believed that ITC "discriminated against long-lived investment and 
was used as a tax shelter device" [Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986, p. 10]. Instead of targeting investment for a 
defined set of assets, capital formation incentives under TRA86 
were provided by lower tax rates and accelerated depreciation. 
15
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TABLE 1 
Changes in the Investment Tax Credit and Rationale for Change 
Legislation 
Revenue Act of 1962 
H.R. 17607 [Public Law 89-800] 
H.R. 6950 [Public Law 90-26] 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 
Revenue Act of 1971 
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 
Revenue Act of 1978 
Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Change 
Investment tax credit enacted 
Investment tax credit suspended 
effective 10/10/66 to 12/31/67 
Investment tax credit 
suspension lifted effective 
3/10/67 
Investment tax credit repealed 
Investment tax credit reinstated 
Temporary increase in the 
investment tax credit from 
7% to 10% 
Temporary increase extended 
to 12/31/80 
Temporary increase made 
permanent effective 1/1/81 
Reduction in depreciable basis 
or reduced credit 
Investment tax credit repealed 
Congressional Rationale 
Stimulate capital formation 
Ease inflation and relieve 
distortions across sectors in 
the economy 
Economic pressure appeared 
to have lifted 
Ease inflationary pressures 
Creating jobs 
Revive economy and 
increase employment 
Stimulating investment 
Stimulating investment 
Combined effect of ACRS and 
investment tax credit was 
perceived to be too generous 
Enhance neutrality of tax system by 
repealing a provision that discriminat-
ed against investment in longer-lived 
assets 
In addition to repealing ITC, Congress modified ACRS. MACRS 
was designed to "provide for more neutral depreciation treatment 
across diverse assets" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
1986, p. 10]. Congress once again returned to the notion that 
recovery periods should more closely reflect the actual useful 
lives of assets. 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993: The Revenue Reconciliation 
Act of 1993 was enacted during a time when reducing budget 
deficits was a primary goal. In it, Congress lengthened the non-
residential realty recovery period from 31.5 to 39 years. With this 
legislation, Congress turned full circle toward having depreciation 
reflect "proper" income measurement with regard to depreciable 
real property. It felt that depreciation deductions had been larger 
than the actual decline in the value of property. In order to 
measure more accurately the economic income derived from 
using nonresidential realty, the recovery period was increased to 
16
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39 years [U.S. Congress, House, Budget Committee, 1993, pp. 625-
626]. With this change the recovery period for buildings returned 
to an amount close to what it was prior to ERTA. With the use of 
component depreciation14 and the facts and circumstances meth-
ods of depreciation, depreciable lives for buildings was effective-
ly 36 to 37 years [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, 
p. 20]. The changes in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 are 
the most recent changes in depreciation. See Table 2 for a sum-
mary of depreciation changes over time. 
TABLE 2 
Changes in Depreciation and Rationale for Changes 
Legislation or Administrative Change Congressional Rationale 
Action 
Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909 
Revenue Act of 1913 
Bulletin F first issued (1920) 
Bulletin F first revised (1931) 
TD 4422 (1934) 
Bulletin F 2nd revision (1942) 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
Small Business Tax Revision Act 
of 1958 
Revenue Procedure 62-21 
Revenue Act of 1962 
Depreciation first appeared 
Depreciation appeared as part of 
the first income tax under the 
16th Amendment 
Determination of depreciation 
expense remained taxpayer 
determined 
Determination of depreciation 
expense remained taxpayer 
determined but an attachment 
provided examples of useful lives 
for over 2,700 different assets 
Required taxpayers to furnish a 
schedule supporting their 
depreciation deduction; limited 
depreciation to an asset's useful life; 
shifted the burden of proof to the 
taxpayer to demonstrate that 
depreciation was properly 
determined 
Treasury Department recommended 
useful lives for over 5,000 assets 
based on studies conducted during 
the Depression 
Congress allowed businesses to use 
any depreciation method as long as 
it did not exceed twice the straight-
line rate 
Immediate expense election 
first introduced 
Provided guideline lives based on 
an industry-by-industry basis rather 
than an asset-by-asset basis 
Section 1245 recapture introduced 
for the first time 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
(Administrative action) 
Stimulate investment while 
remaining within accepted 
economic and accounting 
principles 
Assistance to small businesses 
(Administrative action) 
Raising revenue (recapture 
provisions designed conversion of 
ordinary income to capital gains) 
"Component depreciation allowed a taxpayer to depreciate the parts of a 
building over differing useful lives rather than depreciating the entire over a uni-
form life. 
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TABLE 2 (cont.) 
Legislation or Administrative Change Congressional Rationale 
Action 
Revenue Act of 1964 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 
Revenue Act of 1971 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
Imputed Interest Act of 1985 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 
Recapture (Section 1250) extended 
to buildings 
Section 1250 recapture tightened 
Class Life Asset Depreciation Range 
System introduced (ADR) 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) introduced 
Depreciable basis reduced if 
full investment tax credit taken 
Real property lives extended from 
15 to 18 years 
Real property lives extended from 
18 to 19 years 
Modified ACRS introduced 
extending recovery periods for 
personalty and realty (residential 
realty lives extended to 27.5 years 
and nonresidential extended 
to 31.5 years) 
Extended recovery period for 
nonresidential realty to 39 years 
Raising revenue (recapture provisions 
designed conversion of ordinary 
income to capital gains) 
Revenue raising 
Encourage investment 
Investment stimulus, simplifying 
law, and compensating for inflation 
effects 
Perception that 1981 provisions 
were too generous 
Deficit reduction 
Deficit reduction and bringing useful 
lives for realty closer to actual useful 
lives 
Enhance neutrality in tax system 
Better measurement of economic-
income 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the 90 years since the inception of the modern income tax, 
tax policy and depreciation have come nearly full circle. Until 
1954, depreciation's role was primarily one of proper income 
determination. In 1954, Congress first entertained the notion that 
depreciation could be used to further other tax policy goals, 
specifically encouraging capital formation. From 1954 to 1981, 
income measurement and economic motivations were the prima-
ry tax policy considerations. The investment credit, initially 
enacted in 1962, was turned off and on during this period, justi-
fied entirely on economic grounds. ERTA's enactment in 1981 
marked a major turning point in depreciation policy. For the first 
time, the role of depreciation in income determination was 
ignored. Encouraging investment and simplifying the tax rules 
were the primary motivations behind the law. Soon after ERTAs 
enactment, revenue-raising concerns became important and 
Congress began to lengthen depreciable lives over a series of leg-
islative acts. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 abandoned the notion of 
targeting investment in certain types of assets. The neutrality of 
the tax system became important. ITC was repealed, and ACRS 
18
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was modified based on neutrality considerations. By the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress had come full circle with the 
desire to have better income measurement. Encouraging certain 
forms of investment was no longer paramount. 
Despite Congressional use of depreciation and ITC to further 
economic goals, the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of 
these tax policy tools is quite mixed. There is no consensus about 
the effectiveness of these measures. Since depreciation is based 
on when an asset is placed in service, taxpayers are left with a 
hodgepodge of regulations as a complex legacy of Congressional 
policymaking. For the time being, the current rules for new acqui-
sitions are relatively simple and have returned to useful lives that 
are closer to what they were before ERTA's enactment. History 
indicates, however, that as economic pressures change, deprecia-
tion and ITC are particularly vulnerable to modifications. Each 
change adds another layer of complexity for taxpayers. The 
impact of taxes on investment has been, and is, clearly an impor-
tant issue that warrants further study to assist policymakers in 
shaping the law. 
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